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Introduction
In 2016, the Eurozone is still coping with the consequences of two financial crises that revealed the 
shortcomings of an incomplete monetary union. The European economy suffered two severe reces-
sions and a sustainable growth path is still elusive. Risks in the banking system and a severe bank-
ing sector debt-overhang played a major role in both crises as Eurozone firms are heavily reliant on 
bank financing. To foster economic growth in the Eurozone, the European Commission suggested 
the creation of a capital markets union, in which local capital markets are developed further and 
integrated across borders as alternative sources for corporate finance. In this paper, we argue that 
a capital markets union cannot work without a banking union and fiscal union in place.
Capital Markets Union in Europe with fully integrated capital markets across member countries can 
only work when the status of member country sovereign bonds as risk-free assets is restored. Bank-
ing Union and fiscal union are both required for this outcome. However, the Banking Union remains 
an unfinished project without a European deposit insurance framework and there is little consen-
sus among European leaders at the moment for a fiscal union in the Euro Area. It appears thus that 
the fate of the Capital Markets Union solely rests with the European Central Bank and its ability to 
use the already established mechanisms to further stabilize and integrate the Euro Area in the near 
to medium term.
Key Messages
Research Question  
and Relevance
Market Segmentation in Sovereign Bond Markets
Starting with the financial crisis in 2008-2009, European capital markets became increasingly 
fragmented. This process accelerated with the deepening of the sovereign debt crisis in Europe 
in 2011. A notable example is the government bond market, which is not only the largest capital 
market in Europe but is also critical for the functioning of other capital markets: Government 
bonds used to be the safe assets needed to facilitate transactions and price securities. 
However, the massive public sector debt overhang – that was to some extent caused by financial 
sector bailouts and recovery programs – sparked doubts about the ability of some countries to 
repay their debt. Yield spreads of peripheral countries (Greece, Italy, Ireland, Portugal and Spain, 
GIIPS henceforward) to German bunds widened and investors retrenched to their home market. 
The empirical literature has documented different reasons for this “home bias”: (1) moral hazard 
of weak GIIPS banks to buy domestic government bonds (Acharya and Steffen, 2015), (2) finan-
cial repression, where governments pressure domestic banks to buy their debt during turbulent 
economic times (Becker and Ivashina, 2014); and (3) banks as buyer of last resorts during crises, 
where weak banks buy domestic sovereign debt positively correlated with other sources of rev-
enue (Crosignani, 2015).1 Sovereign debt became entrenched to banks’ balance sheets causing 
large losses when sovereign debt deteriorated in 2011 and the first half of 2012.2
Figure 1 strikingly shows the increase in home bias over time. We plot Italian and Spanish banks’ 
domestic government bond holdings relative to banks’ total assets using data obtained from the 
European Central Bank (ECB) that include all monetary financial institutions in both countries. At 
the same time, yields on Italian and Spanish sovereign bonds were substantially increasing (Fig-
ure 2). They diverged further from, e.g. German bunds, whose yields were even decreasing due to 
elevated demand when investors were scrambling for high-quality assets in a “flight-to-quality”. 
The problems in the government bond market eventually spilled over into other capital markets. 
Sovereign default risk as well as concerns regarding the stability of the Euro Area increased home 
bias in other capital markets in that there emerged substantial country factors in the pricing of 
1 In a German setting, Buch et al. (2014) show that weakly capitalized German banks also hold more domestic sovereign bonds.
2 Short-term investors also ran on banks with large exposures to sovereign debt (Acharya, Pierret and Steffen, 2016). 
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Figure 1: Home Bias
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equity and corporate bond markets. The elevated sovereign risk increased the cost of capital of 
peripheral country firms that continued to diverge from the cost of capital of similar core Euro-
pean companies. 
To illustrate this, we show the emergence of the spread differences on newly issued loans in Eu-
rope (Figure 3). We obtain data from the ECB and plot the spreads on new loans issued to non-
financial firms in GIIPS countries and Cyprus (GIIPS+C) relative to spreads paid by German firms 
since January 2007 in the first graph. The second graph shows the loan spread differential as the 
difference of spreads paid firms in GIIPS countries and Cyprus and Germany. Both figures suggest 
that loan spreads in peripheral countries started to increase relative to Germany at the end of 
2009 and diverged even further in the fall of 2011 and the first half of 2012 when the Euro crisis 
deepened.3
3 The increase in loan spreads is directly linked to the increase in funding costs of the banking sector in the peripheral countries. In its 
quarterly report about the Euro Area, the European Commission showed that funding costs of peripheral banks were two to four times as 
high compared to funding costs of German banks in 2011 and the first half of 2012 (EC, 2015). Acharya et al. (2015) also show that 
low-risk banks reduced loan spreads of customers relative to high-risk banks after the ECB implemented the full allotment principle in 
October 2008.
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Figure 2: 10 - Year Sovereign Bond Yields
Source: Datastream
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Figure 3: Loan Spread Difference
Interest Rates (New Loans) Spread Differential
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Almeida et al. (2016) also provide evidence how sovereign impairments affect corporate bond 
markets. In particular, they show that highly rated firms (those that are better rated compared 
with their sovereigns) are more affected by a sovereign rating downgrade compared to firms that 
are already lower rated than their domestic sovereign. That is, they experience a larger increase 
in cost of debt capital compared to lower rated firms. Moreover, and given the elevated risk of 
being downgraded themselves, highly rated firms reduce debt issuances and leverage and in-
crease issuing equity. However, given adverse market conditions around sovereign downgrades, 
an increase in equity issuance cannot offset the reduction in debt financing resulting in a reduc-
tion in investment activity. 
A functioning Capital Markets Union (CMU) should not feature such spillovers and to ensure that, 
it needs a level-playing field in the holding and transacting of debt and equity securities by mar-
ket participants in different countries. That is, a CMU with fully integrated capital markets can 
only work when the status of sovereign bonds as a risk-free asset is restored and the risk-free rate 
across Euro Area countries is equalized.
Importance of Other Unions to Capital Markets
Banking Union
European leaders have started a series of reforms that will reshape the financial architecture of the 
Eurozone and that are crucial for the CMU to work. The “Banking Union” (BU) that has been agreed 
on in June 2012 and started with the introduction of the Single Supervisory Mechanism (SSM) in 
November 2014 was an important step in this direction. BU consists of three pillars: (1) the SSM, 
(2) the Single Resolution Mechanism (SRM) and (3) a European Deposit Insurance Scheme. 
The “traditional view of banking” is that banks’ liabilities are effectively risk-free (and this, in fact, 
was our understanding until the global financial crisis started in August 2007). The reason is 
three-fold. First, government bonds are risk-free and banks are the largest owner of domestic sov-
ereign debt. Second, depositors are insured preventing bank runs. Third, banking regulation en-
sures that banks are adequately capitalized. These factors contributed to the development of a 
European interbank market, in which banks lend to each other, short-term, without any collater-
al. That allowed the ECB to conduct its monetary policy at a single interbank market rate.4 
The financial crisis revealed the shortcomings of this concept in the context of an (incomplete) 
monetary union. Government bonds are not risk-free across the Eurozone. As banks’ balance 
sheets were bloated with government bonds, the increase in sovereign risk also further increased 
solvency risk of Eurozone banks (Acharya, Drechsler and Schnabl, 2014). Moreover, regulation 
was not harmonized across Euro Area countries. There were differences in deposit insurance 
frameworks causing deposit flights from peripheral to core European banks. Similarly, there were 
differences in accounting standards and banking regulation across countries. Bank insolvency 
was a national problem and regulators were inclined to exercise leniency to avoid a collapse of 
its banking system facilitating the rise of zombie banks and firms in the peripheral countries.
The BU is supposed to address these shortcomings. All banks are directly or indirectly under the 
same supervision using the same set of rules and regulation (SSM). A banking collapse should 
not become a national (i.e. sovereign) problem that increases sovereign risk because of national 
government bails-outs (SRM). The BU should also reduce sovereign-bank linkages and forbear-
ance by national regulators. In particular, BU can help ensure banks in different countries are all 
4 The ECB only needs to make sure that banks have sufficient liquidity to meet their reserve requirements on aggregate, and the interbank 
market ensures that banks that need liquidity can borrow from banks that have abundant liquidity.
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adequately capitalized and do not have incentives to entrench balance-sheets with risky domes-
tic government debt, in turn imposing discipline on domestic fiscal authorities. In other words, 
BU is crucial for CMU to work.
Fiscal Union
CMU also needs a fiscal union that completes the European monetary union. While one aspect 
of fiscal union is budgetary discipline and eventually ceding some sovereignty to a European au-
thority, another important aspect is the ex-post risk-sharing arrangement across Euro Area coun-
tries when a member country is in distress.5 
The problems without having risk-sharing arrangements in place became obvious in 2011 and 
2012, when yields on GIIPS sovereign bonds increased because investors were concerned with 
the solvency of the governments and whether countries remain part of the monetary union. The 
private sector involvement (PSI) in the attempt to solve the Greek debt crisis and eventually hair-
cut private investors by 53.5%, intensified concerns that investors on Eurozone sovereign bonds 
are not repaid in full even when other countries could support these bonds and segmented sov-
ereign bond markets even further. The increase in sovereign bond yields amplified solvency con-
cerns of the sovereigns, and, in absence of a BU, also the solvency risk of the banking system, 
which reinforced the solvency risk of the sovereign. 
In turn, country specific factors began to have a substantial impact on both equity and bond mar-
kets and, consequently, on real economic activity in these countries. A fiscal union is therefore 
crucial to ensure that capital markets are not adversely affected by individual country-level risks. 
Moreover, a fiscal union may not suffice by itself as banks in different countries also need to play 
on a level-playing field in capital markets. Taken together, the BU and fiscal union are both ne-
cessary to build a functioning CMU.
Political Union
Finally, a political union is crucial to prevent limited commitment of national governments that 
can question the effectiveness of fiscal and banking unions.
Role of the ECB: Making-up for a Lack of Political Union
The ECB is at the centre stage of the Eurozone crisis, particularly because of the lack of commit-
ment of national governments with respect to further integration and to address the above men-
tioned shortcomings of the financial architecture of the monetary union.
Currently, the BU also remains an unfinished project. Several core-European countries have refused 
to implement the common deposit insurance framework. Limited committed funding to deal with 
bank insolvencies also compromises the requirement that national governments and taxpayers are 
insulated (ex post) from banking collapse in the future. In other words, the BU has not been able to 
fully address the sovereign-bank “doom loop” (see Figure 1).6 However, the new role of the ECB as 
single regulator of the European banking system is an important first step into this direction.
The ECB had to step in as “lender of last resort” (LOLR) on different occasions, notably, for the 
first time, implementing the full allotment of liquidity in October 2008, and with the 3-year Long-
5 We are agnostic in this article as to how these risk-sharing arrangements can be achieved.
6 Moreover, the BU was implemented to deal with future crises, not to mutualize bad (legacy) assets banks have accumulated during the 
pre-crisis period. The ECB has performed a comprehensive assessment ahead of the start of the SSM, in which it analyzed banks’ 
portfolios using a harmonized set of rules such that any capital shortfall can be addressed by each country individually and all banks are 
adequately capitalized at the start of the ECB. Whether the ECB has been successful in recapitalizing the Euro Area banking system can be 
questioned (compare, e.g. Acharya and Steffen (2014a, b)).
Ex-post Risk-Sharing 
Across Euro Area 
Countries Is Needed
ECB at the Centre Stage 
of the Eurozone Crisis
Term-Refinancing-Operations (LTRO) in December 2011 and February 2012. The ECB was able to 
reduce funding liquidity risk as LOLR (Acharya et al., 2015; Acharya, Pierret and Steffen, 2015). 
However, the LTROs further distorted government bond markets by giving banks’ liquidity to in-
crease their domestic sovereign bond holdings that further segmented the government bond 
market. At the same time, the ECB reduced the collateral requirement for central bank repo trans-
action including also low-rated government bonds.
After European leaders agreed to the BU, ECB President Mario Draghi declared on July 26, 2012, 
during a conference in London that he will do “whatever it takes” to preserve the euro. The ECB 
announced outright purchases of sovereign debt in secondary bond markets and the parameters 
of the OMT program in the following months. A key provision requires countries to participate in 
a financial support program from the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) and comply with the 
required reform efforts. Instead of providing liquidity to the banking system, the ECB announced 
to purchase assets directly acting as a “Buyer of Last Resort” (BOLR). Sovereign bond yields of 
peripheral countries compressed substantially following the announcement because of a reduc-
tion in sovereign default risk (e.g. because of the conditionality and required reform efforts) as 
well as reduction in segmentation and redenomination risk (Krishnamurthy, Nagel and Vissing-
Jorgensen, 2015). 
Lower sovereign bond yields also reduced the risk of the banking system. In fact, it implicitly re-
capitalized the banks holding massive amounts of sovereign bonds and reduced banks’ incen-
tives to hold sovereign debt potentially reducing the sovereign-bank loop (Acharya, Pierret and 
Steffen, 2016). Figure 1 suggests that the OMT program did decelerate the increase in home-bi-
as but did not reverse it. However, foreign investors appear to have started purchasing periph-
eral sovereign bonds suggesting that markets have become more integrated.
While the national governments were hesitant to push for further integration, the ECB “artificial-
ly” created two aspects important in a fiscal union with the OMT program. First, distressed coun-
tries cede some sovereignty when applying for ESM financial assistance. Second, when purchas-
ing the bonds, the ECB effectively introduces risk-sharing among Euro Area countries since in the 
event of the ECB making losses on these bonds, it will likely be recapitalized by stronger coun-
tries in the Eurozone. The convergence of sovereign yields in the Eurozone suggests that the ECB 
effectively moved closer to making government bonds a “safe” asset. In turn, this has helped 
restore conditions for a CMU in the Eurozone.
Conclusion
A functioning Capital Markets Union needs a Banking Union and a fiscal union to work. First steps 
have been made with the start of the Banking Union, the implementation of the Single Supervi-
sory Mechanism and Single Resolution Mechanism. European leaders, however, do not seem to 
have the political will to enforce more integration both with respect to completing the deposit 
insurance part of the Banking Union and to pursuing fiscal union. In fact, arrangements such as 
the Private Sector Involvement created further segmentation.
The European Central Bank (arguably within the mandate to pursue its monetary policy objective) 
introduced the Outright Monetary Transactions program which increased integration among Eu-
rozone member countries. Sovereign yields in the Euro Area started to converge, an important 
step for Capital Markets Union. It is uncertain, however, whether this arrangement can be a vi-
able, long-term solution, so that in the long run only completion of the Banking Union process 
and a movement towards fiscal union are likely to create a sustainable Capital Markets Union.7 
7 The ECB is not an elected government and OMT has already been challenged in open court.
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